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Abstract
Over the past decade a considerable amount of research
has been done to expand logic programming languages
to handle incomplete information. One such language
is the language of epistemic specifications. As is usual
with logic programming languages, the problem of an-
swering queries is intractable in the general case. For
extended disjunctive logic programs, an idea that has
proven useful in simplifying the investigation of an-
swer sets is the use of splitting sets. In this paper we
will present an extended definition of splitting sets that
will be applicable to epistemic specifications. Further-
more, an extension of the splitting set theorem will be
presented. Also, a characterization of stratified epis-
temic specifications will be given in terms of splitting
sets. This characterization leads us to an algorithmic
method of computing world views of a subclass of epis-
temic logic programs.
Introduction
One of the most important areas in artificial intelligence
is knowledge representation. Traditional logic program-
ming has proven itself to be a powerful tool for knowl-
edge representation. There are, however, limitations to
the expressibility of traditional logic programming. In
an attempt to overcome some of the these limitations,
new logic programming formalisms were introduced.
These new formalisms expand the traditional formal-
ism by including disjunction (Min82), classical negation
(GL90), or both (in the case of extended disjunctive
logic programs)(GL91). These formalisms work well
for certain classes of programs. Unfortunately, these
formalisms do not always allow for the correct repre-
sentation of incomplete information in the presence of
multiple belief sets. As an attempt at solving this prob-
lem, the language of epistemic specifications was intro-
duced (Gel91; GP91). A good overview of each of the
formalisms mentioned above can be found in (BG94).
As is usual with logic programming languages, the
problem of answering queries is intractable in the gen-
eral case. It is often useful, however, to find methods
which simplify the query answering task for certain sub-
classes of programs. In (LT93), the usefulness of split-
ting sets for the investigation of answer sets was shown.
In this paper we will present an extended definition of
splitting sets that will be applicable to epistemic spec-
ifications. This in turn leads to an extension of the
splitting set theorem from (LT93). As with EDLPs,
there is a strong relationship between stratification and
splitting sets. Using these ideas, we can develop an al-
gorithmic method for computing world views of a sub-
class of epistemic logic programs.
An overview of the syntax and semantics of epistemic
specifications is covered in Section 2. In Section 3 we
present splitting sets for epistemic specifications and
the main theorem of the paper, the splitting set theo-
rem. Finally, Section 4 contains a discussion of strati-
fication, how it is related to splitting sets, and an algo-
rithm for computing world views of stratified programs
which is based the splitting set theorem.
Epistemic Specifications
The language of epistemic specifications is an exten-
sion of the language of extended disjunctive logic pro-
grams (EDLPs). In addition to the normal operators
in EDLPs, the language of epistemic specifications also
contains unary modal operators K and M . K should
be read as “is known to be true” while M is read as
“may be believed to be true”. Atoms are defined in the
usual way. Literals in the language of epistemic speci-
fications are split into two types, objective literals and
subjective literals. An objective literal is either an atom
or an atom preceded by ¬ (classical negation). A sub-
jective literal is an objective literal preceded by K, M ,
¬K, or ¬M . Given an objective literal, L, we will refer
to the set of four subjective literals that can be built
from L as SubLit(L). Given a set of objective literals,
U , SubLit(U) = {X : L ∈ U and X ∈ SubLit(L)}.
Syntax
The general form for rules in epistemic specifications is
given in (Gel94). In this paper we will restrict rules to
the form:
F1 or . . . or Fn ← G1, . . . , Gk, not Gk+1, . . . , not Gm
where F1, . . . , Fn are objective literals, G1, . . . , Gk are
either objective or subjective literals, andGk+1, . . . , Gm
are objective literals. This form differs from the original
only in the fact that in (Gel94), Gk+1, . . . , Gm were also
allowed to be subjective literals. Notice however that
for any subjective literal, Gi, the value of Gi can never
be unknown and hence not Gi is always equivalent to
¬Gi. It can therefore easily be seen that the restricted
form of rules above can be used without any loss of
expressibility.
A collection of such rules will be referred to as an
epistemic logic program or an epistemic specification.
Given a rule, r,
• head(r) refers to the the set of literals, {F1, . . . , Fn}
which occur in the head of the rule.
• pos(r) refers to the set of all objective literals, L, such
that either
– L = Gi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, or
– Gi ∈ SubLit(L) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
• neg(r) refers to the set of literals, {Gk+1, . . . , Gm}.
• lit(r) = head(r) ∪ pos(r) ∪ neg(r).
Given a epistemic logic program, Π, Lit(Π) will denote
the union of the sets lit(r) for all r ∈ Π.
Semantics
We now move from the syntax of the language to the
semantics. A rule with variables is considered to be
a shorthand for the set of all ground instances of the
rule. The truth or falsity of a literal in an epistemic
logic program is determined by the world views of that
program. A world view is a collection of sets of ground
objective literals which satisfy certain properties. An
objective literal, L, is true with respect to a collection
of sets of literals, W , if it is true in each set in that
collection (i.e. for each set A ∈ W , L ∈ A). If W
is a collection of sets of objective literals and L is an
objective literal then
• KL is true with respect to W (denoted W |= KL) iff
for each set A ∈W , L ∈ A,
• W |= ML iff there exists an A ∈ W such that L ∈ A,
• W |= ¬KL iff W 6|= KL, and
• W |= ¬ML iff W 6|= ML.
A literal is true with respect to an epistemic logic pro-
gram if it is true in every world view of that program.
We will define the concept of a world view of an epis-
temic logic program in several steps.
First let us consider the case when Π is an epistemic
logic program which does not contain not and does not
contain any subjective literals. A set of literals, A, is
called a belief set of Π iff A is a minimal set satisfying
the following two conditions:
• For every rule F1or . . . orFn ← G1, . . . , Gk ∈ Π if
G1, . . . , Gk ∈ A then ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that Fi ∈ A,
• If A contains a pair of contrary literals then A = Lit.
(This belief set is called inconsistent.)
Next we consider an epistemic logic program, Π,
which contains not but does not contain subjective lit-
erals (such programs are extended disjunctive logic pro-
grams). For any such Π and any set A ⊂ Lit(Π), let
ΠA be the program obtained from Π by deleting
• each rule that contains not L in its body where L ∈ A,
and
• all formulas of the form not L in the bodies of the
remaining rules.
The resultant program ΠA does not contain not or sub-
jective literals and therefore its belief sets are as defined
above. We will say a set, A, of literals is a belief set of
Π if A is a belief set of ΠA.
Finally, let Π be an arbitrary epistemic logic pro-
gram. Let, W , be any collection of sets of literals from
Lit(Π) and let ΠW be the program obtained by
• removing each rule which contains a subjective lit-
eral, L, where W 6|= L, and
• removing all subjective literals from the bodies of the
remaining rules.
Notice that ΠW does not contain subjective literals,
therefore we can compute its belief sets as previously
described. If W is the set of all of the belief sets of ΠW
then W is a world view of Π.
We will say that a world view of an epistemic logic
program is consistent if it does not contain a belief set
consisting of all literals. We will say an epistemic logic
program is consistent if it has at least one consistent
non-empty world view.
Intuitively, a belief set is a set of literals that a ra-
tional agent may believe to be true. A world view is a
set of belief sets that a rational agent may believe to be
true with respect to that “world”.
The following give examples of epistemic logic pro-
grams and their world views.
Example 1 Let Π1 be the program which consists of
the rules:
1. p(a) or p(b)←
2. p(c)←
3. q(d)←
4. ¬p(X)← ¬ Mp(X)
The set
W = {{q(d), p(a), p(c),¬p(d)}, {q(d), p(b), p(c),¬p(d)}}
consisting of two belief sets, can be shown to be the only
world view of Π1.
Example 2 For the next example, consider the pro-
gram, Π2, consisting of the following two rules:
1. p(a)← ¬Mq(a)
2. q(a)← ¬Mp(a)
It can be seen that Π2 has two world views: W1 =
{{q(a)}} and W2 = {{p(a)}}.
Example 3 As a final example, consider the program,
Π3 consisting of only one rule,
p(a)← ¬Kp(a).
It can be shown that this program does not have a world
view.
In general, to find the world view of a epistemic logic
program one must either try all possible collections of
sets of literals or guess. It is infeasible to try all com-
binations since, even for the case where the number of
ground literals, n, is finite, there are 22
n
possibilities.
A guess-and-check method could possibly be used to
find world views but the problem is how to create an
algorithm which would make good “educated” guesses
and would know when and if it has found all the of the
world views.
In this paper, we are primarily interested in present-
ing a means of computing world views. As a first step
in achieving this goal, we will limit ourselves to pro-
grams which have at most a finite number of world
views. For the remainder of this paper we will only
consider epistemic logic programs which do not contain
function symbols and have a finite number of constants
and predicate symbols.
Splitting Sets
In this section we will present a definition of splitting
sets of epistemic logic programs. The definition is an ex-
tension of the definition in (LT93). We will also present
a version of the splitting set theorem that is applicable
to epistemic logic programs.
Definition 1 (Splitting Set) A set, U , of objective
literals is a splitting set of a epistemic logic program,
Π, iff
• for every rule r ∈ Π, if head(r)∩U 6= 0 then lit(r) ⊂
U , and,
• if Π contains K or M , then for any objective literal,
p ∈ lit(Π), if p ∈ U then p ∈ U .
If U is a splitting set of Π, we also say that U splits
Π. The set of all rules r ∈ Π such that lit(r) ⊂ U is
denoted by bU (Π) and is called the bottom of Π with
respect to U . The set Π\bU (Π) is called the top of Π
with respect to U .
Using a splitting set, one can break the computation
of a world view of an epistemic specification into two
parts, a bottom and a top. The basic idea is to first
compute the world view of the bottom of the program.
The world view of the top can then be computed, taking
into consideration the what was already computed for
the bottom. Finally the two parts are merged together
to get the world view of the complete program.
The world view of the bottom can be computed with-
out regard to the top since no literal which occurs in
the head of a rule of the top can occur anywhere in
the bottom. When computing the world view for the
top however, one needs to take the world view of the
bottom into consideration. The world view of the bot-
tom of the program can be used to “reduce” the top of
the program. We can remove from the top those rules
which cannot be satisfied because the value of a literal
computed in the bottom makes their bodies false. From
the remaining rules one can remove the portions of the
bodies of the rules that were determined to be true. The
reduction is performed in two steps; one for subjective
literals and one for objective ones.
To remove subjective literals we will introduce the
idea of a restricted reduct.
Definition 2 (Restricted Reduct) Let Π be an
epistemic logic program, W be a collection of sets of
literals, and U be a set of literals. The restricted reduct
is the program obtained from Π by:
1. removing from Π all rules containing subjective for-
mulae G where G ∈ SubLit(U) and W 6|= G.
2. removing all other occurrences of subjective formula
G where G ∈ SubLit(U).
The resultant program will be denoted by Πr(U,W ) and
be referred to as the reduct of Π with respect to W ,
restricted by U .
In our intended use, Π, would be the top of a program,
U , would be the set used to split the program, and W
would be the world view of the bottom.
The following is an example of a restricted reduct.
Example 4
Let W = {{a,¬b, d}, {a,¬d}},
U = {a,¬a, b,¬b, c,¬c}, and
Π = e← a, M¬b, f
g ← Ka, h
i←Mc
j ← Kd, k
then Πr(U,W ) = e← a, f
g ← h
Next we consider objective literals. Recall that the
world view of the bottom of a program is in essence
a set of belief sets, all of which are different. Because
of this, the truth or falsity of the objective literals in
the bodies of rules of the top may vary with respect to
each belief set. Due to this fact, after performing the
reduction described below, rather than being left with a
single program, we have, in general, a different partially
evaluated top for each belief set of the bottom.
Definition 3 (Partial Evaluation) Given two sets
of objective literals, U and X, and an epistemic speci-
fication, Π, for which none of the literals from U or X
occur subjectively in its rules, then eU (Π, X) = {r
′: ∃
rule r ∈ Π such that pos(r) ∩ U ⊂ X and neg(r) ∩ U
is disjoint from X, r′ is the rule which results from re-
moving each sub-formula of the form L or not L from
r, where L ∈ U}. We refer to eU (Π, X) as the partial
evaluation of Π with respect to X.
Here again, in our intended use Π would be the top of
the program, U would be the splitting set used, and X
would be one of belief sets from the world view of the
bottom.
As was mentioned above, after taking the restricted
reduct of the top and then finding the partial evaluation
of the result with respect to each of the belief sets of
the bottom, we are often left with multiple “tops”. We
cannot simply take the world view of each “top” and
merge them together. The reason for this is that it does
not guarantee that the truth of subjective literals in the
merged world view are the same as they were in each
“top”. To handle this problem we introduce the idea of
a multi-view.
Definition 4 (Multi-view) Given epistemic logic
programs Π1, . . . ,Πn, then a collection of sets of objec-
tive literals, W , is a multi-view of Π1, . . . ,Πn iff
1. W = (
⋃n
i=1 ans(Π
W
i ))\{Lit} ( if ∃i s.t. ans(Π
W
i ) is
consistent)
2. W = {{Lit}} (otherwise)
A multi-view, W , is consistent iff W 6= {{Lit}}. For
each Πi, the set of all belief sets of Π
W
i is called the
restricted view of Πi with respect to W.
Here a simple example of a multi-view.
Example 5
If Π1 = a←
b←
c← Kb
and Π2 = a←
c← Kb
then Π1,Π2 has only one multi-view, {{a, b},{a}}.
Before we present the main theorem of the paper
we must first present a new notation and a definition.
Given a collection of sets of objective literals, W , and
a set of literals, U , then
W |U = {X : ∃Wi ∈W,X =Wi ∩ U}.
Definition 5 (Safe) Given an Epistemic Specification
Π with splitting set U such that ΠU = bU (Π) and ΠU =
Π\ΠU , Π is said to be safe with respect to U iff ∀W =
{W1, . . . ,Wn} if {W1|U , . . . ,Wn|U} ⊆ ans(Π
W
U ) then
∀A ∈ ans(ΠWU ) : (eU (Π
W
U
, A)) is consistent.
Theorem 1 Let Π be an epistemic specification, U be
a splitting set of Π such that Π is safe with respect to
U . If we denote bU (Π) as ΠU , and Π\ΠU as ΠU then:
1. If
X = {X1, . . . , Xn}
is a consistent world view of ΠU and Y is a consistent
multi-view of
(eU (Π
r(U,X)
U
, X1), . . . , eU (Π
r(U,X)
U
, Xn))
then ifW = {Wi : Wi = Xj∪Yk, whereXj ∈ X,Yk ∈
ans((eU (Π
r(U,X)
U
, Xj))
Y ) and Xj ∪ Yk is consistent
} 6= {} then W is a consistent world view of Π.
2. If W is a consistent world view of Π then ∃X,Y such
that X is a world view of ΠU , Y is a multi-view of
(eU (Π
r(U,X)
U
, X1), . . . , eU (Π
r(U,X)
U
, Xn))
and
∀Wi ∈ W (Wi|U ∈ X
and
Wi|U ∈ ans((eU (Π
r(U,X)
U
,Wi|U ))
Y )
In the above theorem we require that the splitting set
be safe with respect to the program. As we will show,
this restriction is important. If one or more or the belief
sets of the bottom does not have a consistent extension
to the top, the value of subjective literals defined in the
bottom may change. In this case, the above method
may not compute a correct world view.
Example 6 Consider the program, Π4, with the fol-
lowing rules:
1. p(a) or p(b)←
2. p(c)←Mp(b)
3. p(d)← p(b)
4. ¬p(d)← p(b)
If we split the program using
U = {p(a),¬p(a), p(b),¬p(b), p(c),¬p(c)}
as a splitting set, then bU (Π4), which consists of rules
1 and 2, has one world view which contains 2 belief
sets, {p(a), p(c)} and {p(b), p(c)}. With respect to the
belief set {p(b), p(c)}, however, the top of the program is
inconsistent. Using the method from the theorem above,
not requiring the program be safe, we get one “world
view”: {{p(a), p(c)}}. It can easily be seen however,
that this is not a world view of Π4. The only world
view of the program is {{p(a)}}.
The error occurred because, since p(b) was “possible”
in the world view the bottom we concluded p(c) was
therefore true even though we later find that p(b) is no
longer “possible” after the computation of the top.
As can be seen from the definition, determining if a
splitting set of a program is safe may be as difficult
as finding the world views. We will give a property
which is more intuitive and easier to check. While it
is less general, it is reasonable and encompasses a large
number of interesting programs. Before we present the
condition, we must first define satisfies.
Definition 6 (Satisfies) Given a program Π and a
collection of sets of literals from Lit(Π), denoted W ,
then we will say W satisfies the body of a rule, r ∈ Π,
if each literal in the body is true with respect to W . We
say W satisfies r if either W does not satisfy the body
of r or at least one literal in the head of r is true with
respect to W .
We now present the property.
Definition 7 (Guarded) We will say that a program
Π is guarded with respect to a splitting set U
• Π does not contain subjective literals, or
• for every pair of rules R1, R2 ∈ Π\bU (Π) and for ev-
ery collection of sets of literals from Lit(Π), denoted
as W , if head(R1) and head(R2) contain contrary
literals and W satisfies all of the rules in bU (Π) then
either W does not satisfy the body of R1 or W does
not satisfy the body of R2. Note that a rule with an
empty head can be rewritten as a rule which has the
predicate ¬true as the head and by adding the rule
true←
to the program. A program containing rules with
empty heads is guarded with respect to U if the pro-
gram rewritten without such rules is.
It can be shown that, given any program Π with split-
ting set U , if Π is guarded with respect to U then U is
safe with respect to Π.
Splitting and Stratification
In this section we will give a definition of stratifica-
tion for epistemic logic programs, show how it relates
to splitting sets, and illustrate how the splitting set the-
orem can be used to simplify the computation of the
world view of a stratified epistemic logic program. We
will start out with the definition of stratification.
Definition 8 (Stratification) A partitioning
pi0, . . . , piz
of the set of all literals of an epistemic logic program,
Π, is a stratification of Π, if for any literal, L1 ∈ pii,
then
¬L1 ∈ pii
and for any other literal L2 in Lit(Π) and any rule
r ∈ Π:
• if L1, L2 ∈ head(r) then L2 ∈ pii.
• if L1 ∈ head(r) and L2 occurs objectively in pos(r)
then there exists an j ≤ i such that L2 ∈ pij .
• if L1 ∈ head(r) and L2 ∈ neg(r) or L2 occurs subjec-
tively in r, then there exists j < i such that L2 ∈ pij.
This stratification of the literals defines a stratifica-
tion of the rules of Π to strata Π0, . . . ,Πk where a strata
Πi contains all of the rules of Π whose heads consists of
literal from pii. A program is called stratified if it has a
stratification.
It can easily be seen that, given a stratified epistemic
logic program, Π, with stratification pi0, . . . , piz , the set
of literal Ui such that
Ui =
i⋃
j=1
pij
is a splitting set of Π. With each stratified epis-
temic logic program we will then associate a sequence
U0, . . . , Uz of splitting sets formed as described.
This leads us to an algorithm for computing the world
view a safe, stratified epistemic specification. Given an
epistemic specification, Π, with stratification pi0, . . . , pin
and associated splitting sets U0, . . . , Un, such that Π is
safe with respect to { } and each Ui, we can compute
the world view of Π as follows:
1. Using the splitting set theorem, compute the world
view, W1, of Π0∪Π1 with splitting set U0. Note that
bU0 = Π0 and, by the definition of stratification, it
does not contain not or any subjective literals. Π0 is
also safe with respect to { }. From these two facts, it
can be seen that Π0 has a unique, consistent, world
view which consists of all the belief sets of the EDLP
Π0.
2. Given the world view, Wi−1, of Π0 ∪ . . . ∪ Πi−1, the
world view, Wi, of Π0 ∪ . . . ∪ Πi can be computed
using the splitting set theorem with the splitting set
Ui−1.
Notice that Wn is the world view of Π. It can be seen
from the definition of stratification that, in each step of
the algorithm above, when we take the restricted reduct
of the top of program we are left with a program which
does not contain subjective literals. The multi-view is
therefore simply the union of the world views obtained
by taking the restricted reduct of the top and partially
evaluating with respect to one of the belief sets of the
world view of the bottom. To compute the world view
of a safe, stratified, epistemic logic program therefore,
one only needs to be able to compute the belief sets of
extended disjunctive logic programs.
The following theorem, which is a slightly modified
version of a theorem from (Wat94), also follows from
the results above.
Theorem 2 Given any stratified, epistemic logic pro-
gram, Π, which is safe with respect to { } as well as
each of the splitting sets associated with its stratifica-
tion, the program Π has a unique, consistent, world
view.
Conclusion
In this paper, we expanded the results from (LT93) to
include epistemic logic programs. We also presented
definitions of what it means for a epistemic logic pro-
gram to be safe, guarded, and stratified. This led to
an algorithmic method for computing world views of a
subclass of epistemic logic programs.
It should be noted that the belief sets of an extended
disjunctive logic program are simply the answer sets
(GL91) of that program. Recently, there have been
considerable advances in the computation of such an-
swer sets. One such system which shows great promise
is DLV (Leo97). Using their system and the results in
this paper, it should be a reasonable task to create a
inference engine for the subclass of epistemic logic pro-
grams mentioned here.
As this paper is meant to form a basis for the com-
putation of world views, we restricted ourselves to epis-
temic logic programs with a finite number of finite world
views. We believe that the theorem presented here can
be expanded to cover programs with an infinite number
of infinite world views.
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